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Thank you very much for allowing me to be here. It is a privilege 
to come back to the Duke University School of Law. It was an 
enormous privilege to be here as a student many years ago and, of 
course, the law school is an even better law school now than it was 
then because of, among other things, the increase in size of faculty 
and the continuing evolution of faculty quality. I was very glad that 
they allowed me to attend law school here back when that happened, 
and I feel even more privileged to be here now. Thank you for 
permitting me to provide a few remarks. 
I think it is interesting to go back to 1787 and 1861 and to talk a 
little bit about certain former presidents of the United States, which 
backward step into the historical record actually is not as irrelevant as 
it might seem. In my time at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB) of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), we thought and 
talked often about President Abraham Lincoln, and only from time to 
time about Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. But 
Jefferson and Madison, like Lincoln, are relevant to patent 
discussions, generally, and to our discussion at this symposium. 
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Jefferson and Madison are the presidents who, among their 
pursuits, spent a considerable amount of time talking about cost-
benefit analysis in the context of patents. In fact, cost-benefit 
analysis—which is one of the principal subjects of this symposium—is 
at the very core of their letter correspondence1 on the subject of 
patents, which correspondence mainly took place during the 
formation of the Constitution, and then, thereafter, as part of their 
discussion relating to the first patent legislation. A quick look back at 
what they said helps frame some of the context to better understand 
the cost-benefit-analysis discussion going on currently. 
But let me go to President Lincoln first, who is perhaps a little 
less germane to some of the discussion from today, but whose 
engagement with the patent system also contributes to the notion of a 
patent-system exceptionalism that always has existed and still is in 
evidence today, as can be seen in the existence and relevance of the 
PTAB. 
President Lincoln is quite appropriately in the league with 
Jefferson and Madison as a candidate for the title of the “Patent 
President.” Among other things, he is the only president who actually 
had a patent issued in his name, being himself an inventor. He is also 
the president who really formed what today has become the PTAB. 
In 1861, he followed through on an Act of Congress2 that had been 
passed at the end of the administration of the President James 
Buchanan in the fall of 1860, which Act called for some number of 
people, three in particular, to review actions of the Patent Office and, 
possibly, to enter reversals of decisions by the Patent Office. It is that 
three-person board, then formed, which evolved over the course of 
some 152 or 153 years into what, today, is the PTAB. Eventually, 
from that group of reviewers, there came to be a Board of Appeals to 
which disappointed patent applicants could appeal, and then, later, 
there also came to be a Board of Interferences, which heard contests 
between patentees disputing ownership of the same inventions. At a 
point in time, those two Boards merged to form the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences, which Congress later transformed, under 
the America Invents Act of 2011, into the PTAB. That is the tribunal 
 
 1. See Robert Thibadeau, Thomas Jefferson and Intellectual Property including Copyrights 
and Patents, SATURDAY AFTERNOON ADVENTURES ON THE INTERNET (Aug. 28, 2004), 
http://rack1.ul.cs.cmu.edu/jefferson [http://perma.cc/HPT3-FEJU]. 
 2. Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, § 3, 12 Stat. 246, 246–47. 
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I had the pleasure of leading for four and a half years and which 
Board we have spent time discussing today. 
One might be disposed to think that the discussion today reflects 
some special and new emergence of the importance of the review of 
Patent Office decisions, but that would not be an appropriate 
conclusion. It is not altogether new that we would stop to observe the 
unique importance of a tribunal operating in the patent space in the 
way that the PTAB does. To put the seeming novelty in truer context, 
when President Lincoln appointed the first three reviewers to serve as 
a board of review for decisions by Patent Office Examiners, it was, 
more specifically, in March of 1861. March 1861 is when he began the 
consideration of the candidates for appointment to the Board, and my 
understanding is that he made the appointments starting in April of 
1861. 
Those of you versed in U.S. history will recall that those are the 
very same months in which President Lincoln was giving thought as to 
how to handle the situation at Fort Sumter, the fort in South Carolina 
under siege or about to be under siege by the states in rebellion. Such 
weighty matters as the siege in South Carolina being on his plate, 
Lincoln nonetheless gave committed attention to the issue of the 
operation of this new type of patent tribunal. That is, the patent 
matters, or shall we say the “pre-PTAB patent matters” apparently 
received an amount and even, possibly, a depth of thought right 
alongside the consideration being given to the issue of the possible 
breakup of the United States. I find it amazing to think that these 
particular patent matters would receive such presidential attention; 
and I am willing to suggest that the giving of this level of presidential 
attention is demonstrative of patent matters having a history of at 
least some exceptional treatment. 
Nor was Lincoln’s contemplation of the patent system and how it 
might improve through the operation of a group of reviewers serving 
as an appellate tribunal merely one that he took on at arm’s length, as 
a chief executive looking at another agency among the many within 
the national government. His appointment to the position as the 
chairman of that Board was that of a lawyer by the name of George 
Harding, with whom Abraham Lincoln actually had tried a patent 
case. Thus, his involvement with the overall process was not one of 
disinterested executive oversight, but a reach into his own personal 
involvement in the patent space and from his time in patent litigation. 
This personal experience and engagement prompted Lincoln to his 
particular choice of the person to lead the patent-appeal function. 
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But President Lincoln is perhaps not the most relevant president 
to some of the ideas that have been raised in the symposium today. 
He is certainly the most relevant to the PTAB itself, but not to other 
issues such as, for example, cost-benefit analysis, and the assessments 
we might undertake of work output and levels of scrutiny used by 
different “cohorts” of patent examiners. 
You will recall that, when the Constitution of the United States 
was being hammered out, and somewhat contrary to most people’s 
recollection of the history of the situation, Thomas Jefferson was not 
in the United States and not a regular participant in those discussions. 
Rather, Jefferson’s participation in those discussions took place by 
way of correspondence through James Madison, who was very 
intimately involved in the process and, of course, here in the United 
States. Thomas Jefferson was in Paris and in other parts of France, 
serving a brief period as one of this young country’s emissaries to that 
much older country. 
Please note here that my implicit ratification in my remarks of 
Thomas Jefferson as a Patent Demigod, whose guidance I firmly 
believe we do well to embrace, is made notwithstanding my true 
appreciation of deep flaws in Jefferson’s thoughts and actions. 
First, let us observe that, when Jefferson was in France, he was 
not there alone. He was there with, among other people, a young lady 
by the name of Sally Hemings, whom history has treated quite 
unfairly. We think often of Michelle Obama as being the first African 
American First Lady, which she really is not. She is second on that 
list, after Sally Hemings. When Jefferson had returned to the United 
States and become president, his relationship with Sally Hemings had 
expanded and deepened about as much as had his relationship with 
the United States. In fact, one only need consult the birth records of 
the Jefferson-Hemings children to see that when Jefferson was not in 
Washington but in Charlottesville, there was no shortage of 
interaction between Jefferson and Sally Hemings. She was most 
certainly, in all his presidential years, the person with whom Jefferson 
lived when not in Washington, his companion, and his partner in 
procreation and other domestic endeavors. Accordingly, if assessing 
such things as we do normally, it is hard not to concede that she was 
early to the role as “significant other” of the president, second in time 
only to the likes of Martha Washington and Abigail Adams. 
If we are able to set aside Jefferson’s big misdeeds—that of 
hiding Sally Hemings from the public and of allowing their joint 
offspring to be slaves—we still might find ourselves quite fond of 
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Thomas Jefferson. His contributions to the patent system are truly 
enormous not only because of his early thoughts and guidance as to 
the role patents could and eventually did play in a vibrant national 
economy, but also because he helped—after he was back in this 
country, and after the Constitution was in place—to hammer out the 
first Patent Acts,3 which really made the patent system manifest itself 
quite effectively in the United States. And his legislative involvement 
is only one of his post-Constitution contributions, another one of 
them being his quite deep and seminal involvement in the patent 
system as, effectively, the first U.S. Commissioner of Patents. 
Going back, however, to the constitutional period and 
Jefferson’s discussions with Madison, you will remember that the 
most fundamental part of their discussion really centered on this one 
essential issue: Are the benefits of patents really worth their 
tremendous cost? And Jefferson particularly is noted for having 
emphasized how high the cost is of granting a monopoly, because 
monopolies—particularly monopolies on ideas and inventions—are 
truly expensive things for which everyone bears the cost. Accordingly, 
his predisposition was that patent monopolies should be avoided, 
indeed, that they not be granted. 
But Jefferson was persuaded in the dialogue with Madison, who 
more often took the other side of that debate; namely, that although 
the cost of monopoly is high, the advantages of monopoly—as reward 
for invention—are themselves quite high, sufficiently so that we 
should consent to suffer the cost to the public. 
On the subject of cost-benefit analysis in the context of this 
symposium’s papers,4 one issue perhaps worthy of more discussion 
involves the additional, and usually ignored, benefit inuring directly, 
but counterintuitively, to the public from blocking the practice of a 
patented invention. Specifically, once there is innovation moving 
forward through any particular technological channel, the common 
first reaction is to think that it is necessarily a bad thing for those 
other than the patentee not to be allowed to proceed down that same 
channel of innovation. But one of the not-so-often-discussed benefits 
to the public that arises has to do precisely with that blocking of a 
particular channel of innovation with a patent. That prohibition 
forces innovation in other channels, those channels themselves 
possibly yielding equally beneficial innovation, or possibly yielding 
 
 3. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. 
 4. See Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 DUKE L.J. 1699 (2016). 
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innovation which ultimately spurs even more profound 
breakthroughs than those advancements that would have been 
brought about had that blocked channel been open. 
Generally, I suspect that were Jefferson’s and Madison’s eyes, 
again, to be on the calculus of benefits and costs involved in 
constructing a system for rewarding innovation, and were they to be 
thinking of the added complexity that characterizes technology and 
economics in modern times as compared with the state of those things 
in the late 1700s, they would be somewhat surprised if, in the current 
day, we did not find ourselves still somewhat intimidated and 
perplexed by the daunting task of the cost-benefit analysis associated 
with patents, because so much of what that involves touches on things 
which perhaps are not truly quantifiable. For example, how exactly 
does one measure how much money it takes to move someone into 
his garage for years at a time, to battle upstream against doubt and 
bad economics, to work through some innovation that, in the end, 
might or might not transform society? The incentive structure and the 
types of rewards that really move invention forward probably require 
continuing study, as we look at and evolve the regulations around 
patenting. Meanwhile, it is perhaps appropriate to recognize a certain 
amount of the imponderable as to what invention is and how the 
opportunities for reward actually move human beings. 
Another subject covered by the symposium papers is how to 
evaluate the performance of groups or “cohorts” of patent examiners, 
and the actual standard of patentability they apply in their work.5 Few 
subjects could be more Jeffersonian. In fact, Jefferson, by himself, 
formed the first cohort of examiners because he was the first 
examiner. Subsequently, he was part of the first group of examiners, 
which he selected, presumably with at least some input from George 
Washington. 
The record appears to reveal that, during Jefferson’s time in the 
role of examiner, he had changes in his view as to how much 
examination scrutiny should be applied in reviewing patent 
applications, deciding in the first instance that very intensive scrutiny 
should be applied to every application. This resulted in the grant of 
only as few as half a dozen or so patents in any one year. Later, it 
appears that, because of an onslaught of possibly as many as one 
hundred patent applications in a single year, it was decided that the 
 
 5. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. 
1599 (2016). 
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standard of scrutiny should be adjusted. Throughout these various 
periods of time during which the scrutiny level changed, Jefferson was 
involving different individuals in the process, thus creating additional, 
different sets of examiner cohorts who worked together, through 
successive regimes of training and decisionmaking to provide the 
country a body of patents. Accordingly, the national patent estate at 
any given time in that era (as is true in the current era) was the direct 
result of whatever decisions they had been making as to how they 
should equip themselves to carry out the examination duties and how 
stringent the process should be. It would be interesting to apply 
today’s analytical methods, if we could, to understand more precisely 
the impacts of the changes they made in the patent era in which they 
made those changes. 
The symposium also addresses the subjects of the appropriate 
level of deference to give to decisionmakers in Executive Branch 
agencies6 and the appropriateness of stacking judges on trial and 
appellate panels—topics which also resonate with the issues present 
in the days of Jefferson and Madison. They may not have confronted 
such issues in the patent context specifically, but they dealt with them 
in other contexts, leaving us with their views on those subjects, and 
thus allowing us to apply those views—if we so desire and are able to 
do so—in the patent field also. Looking at deference, there is one 
kind of deference I particularly hope PTAB decisions will receive. I 
always hope there will be occasion to see in the mindset brought to 
the review of the PTAB’s decisions a predisposition of respect—one 
which possibly would be both unintended and never expressly 
articulated—which is to say a kind of invisible deference that is never 
unfair to appellants—a deference grounded on the routinely high-
quality reasoning and exposition to be found in PTAB decisions. 
It is important to look at the structure of review, how the law 
frames around the different arms of government and how they are 
called to undertake adjudicatory review of an agency’s work. And it is 
important to follow the law as to such matters. A grounding in 
common sense and practicality also is important. The comment has 
been made in the context of standards of review, that, after a person 
gets past the standards-of-review question, standards of review not 
being unimportant, there is the question: “How good is your case 
anyway, no matter what the standard of review is?” Similarly in the 
 
 6. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent 
Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2016). 
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context of deference, it might be appropriate to conclude that, as one 
deals with issues such as Chevron7 deference, there is this 
fundamental question about the decision made by an agency tribunal: 
When you look at the decision itself, do you think the tribunal got it 
right? I think a tribunal that is seen as routinely making correct 
decisions necessarily will have an advantage, however hidden, in the 
discussion as to whether or not it should be afforded deference 
formally. 
I also wanted to address, briefly, the subject of the PTAB as a 
“first mover” or as a “prime mover” in the part of the system where 
adjudicated decisions drive developments in the making of, or at least 
in the interpretation of, patent law.8 I think one thing that should be 
clear is that, if we were to make a diagram of the patent system—one 
that includes the PTAB as a part of the system, we would see the 
PTAB generating outputs and also receiving inputs from other parts 
of the system. Some of those inputs come to the PTAB as outputs 
from other parts of the system, most notably, in the form of binding 
decisions from the U.S Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. And 
the inputs include decisions from district courts when, for example, 
those courts reach conclusions as to the interpretation of patent 
claims. Such interpretations may usefully inform claim-interpretation 
decisions being made by the PTAB on the patent claims when those 
same claims are the subject of parallel litigation involving the same 
patent, even when those district court claim-interpretation decisions 
are not binding on the PTAB. 
Our diagram also would show that the various inputs arriving at 
the PTAB are sometimes “first-instance inputs” not already bearing 
some input from the PTAB, including for example Federal Circuit 
decisions in cases arising from district courts and with no part of the 
matter having been adjudicated by the PTAB. The inputs also may be 
“feedback inputs,” being in the nature of feedback because, for 
example, they result from decisions by the Federal Circuit coming 
about from appeals of PTAB decisions, which Federal Circuit 
decisions then arrive back at the PTAB. Having so arrived, the 
Federal Circuit decisions might constitute general guidance for all 
future PTAB cases on given issues or, possibly, remand instructions 
for a particular case. 
 
 7. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
 8. See John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 1655 (2016). 
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Once the system is providing inputs to the PTAB, which are 
coming as first-instance inputs and as feedback inputs, the question 
well might be asked which part of the system is operating first or as 
the “prime operator” in causing evolution in patent law. Should 
movement in the system or in the evolution of the system be seen as 
beginning in a particular part of the system (that is, at the PTAB), or 
as beginning with the feedback that was provided into that part of the 
system (that is, with a decision from the Federal Circuit that was 
appealed from the PTAB and then went back to the PTAB)? Does 
the evolution of the patent system and patent law begin with a 
decision or the review of the decision? It could be argued that the 
movement of the system can come about as much from the early and 
forthright introduction of a new approach to issues by a lower 
tribunal as from the final adjudication by a higher court of a case in 
which the new approach has been advanced. 
Many parts of the administrative estate in “patent world” impact 
what we see as “outputs” and influence what decisions are made and 
how they are made, but I think there is something to be said for any 
agency that can act well and quickly to help define the space it 
regulates and determine an effective state of affairs. The PTAB has 
an advantage in this regard because in all its trial matters the law 
requires it to act quickly, including by rendering final decisions in 
trials in no more than 365 days after the adjudicative process in an 
inter partes matter begins. 
As a practical example of an area in which we might see how the 
PTAB could be the prime mover in defining the regime that exists, let 
us consider the example of claim interpretation, and the question as 
to which one of several tribunals could be most impactful as to what 
patent claims mean. This question arises in the context of the more 
general discussion as to the use of the “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” standard, which is the current PTAB approach for 
interpreting patent claims. The broadest reasonable interpretation 
exists in contrast to “district court interpretation,” which is not 
intended to provide the broadest interpretation, but a possibly 
narrower interpretation of patent claim language more aimed at 
preserving the validity of patent claims. 
Let me divert only momentarily to say this—it is important, 
when considering these two standards, also to ask this question: How 
big a difference is there between the two approaches, practically 
speaking? Many people will tell you that in 80 to 90 percent of the 
instances they see, the difference between broadest reasonable 
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interpretation and the Phillips9 or district-court standard is 
inconsequential. And then, in the remaining 10 or 20 percent, the 
debate has to do with whether there is a difference and, if so, whether 
the degree of difference is significant? 
In any event, notwithstanding whatever good reasons that may 
have caused the Patent Office to decide to have a regulation in favor 
of broadest reasonable interpretation for deciphering claim language 
in PTAB trials, and with that operating as a possible point of unique 
and outcome-determinative influence for the Patent Office, I am very 
much of the view that a switch to the district-court standard actually 
would enhance the power of the PTAB, causing its decisions to 
deliver even more upfront impact in the system. That is, its role as 
first or prime mover would be enhanced. Because, by statute,10 the 
PTAB nearly always acts most quickly in the context of patent 
trials—by always having aggressive discovery, briefing, and trial 
schedules—if the PTAB used the same claim-interpretation standard 
as district courts, the PTAB very often would be the first tribunal 
deciding any issue of claim interpretation, which issue might arise, 
again, at another tribunal, such as a district court. And, having 
decided the claim-interpretation issues first, and probably often 
without later contradiction by a court, the PTAB decisions will set the 
direction of claim interpretation based on the primacy that results 
from acting first. At a minimum, even if another tribunal—for 
example, a district court—were to pick up a related claim-
interpretation issue after the PTAB had considered that same issue, 
that court at least would find itself needing to acknowledge that a first 
mover—the PTAB—already had undertaken to make a decision. 
Then, that court either would or would not follow the PTAB 
decision—with an explanation inherently comparative in nature, with 
the PTAB decision as the baseline. 
I have touched on several of the topics that are raised in this 
symposium. In the course of doing this, I have given what I hope will 
be seen as a very respectful nod to three great presidents of this 
country, whose framework and orientation to patent matters, and 
respect for patents, I try to keep in my mind whenever I come to 
greater and lesser questions about the patent system. The great 
people who sought to put into our Constitution provisions that allow 
the extension of patent protection to inventors, for all the things they 
 
 9. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 10. See 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11) (2012). 
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might have done right or wrong in their personal lives—things which 
might, if they had been given the light of day, have led to more or less 
disgrace of their names—one thing is certainly true: They were 
extraordinarily forward-thinking about what might be achieved in our 
economy by taking the time to look at intellectual property and the 
tremendously beneficial things patents might do for us. 
I do not think there is any person who credibly can assert that 
the United States has not done well to leverage the creativity of its 
people using the recognition and reward system that we have 
constructed. That system has helped bring about—or at least has not 
prevented—extraordinary levels of innovation operating to the 
benefit of the whole planet. It may well be that the patent system 
needs improvement, and has within it dysfunction; I doubt there is 
anyone who would argue that problems do not exist and that 
improvement is not needed. But I think we all can acknowledge that 
most of us live today, in this country and in other parts of the world, 
in a way that benefits tremendously from innovation arising in this 
county. This innovation has no comparison anywhere in the world or 
in human history, and it emerged because of how we have harnessed 
the energy, willingness, and ability of inventors, so that, within the 
system of government and rules we have in place, they continue to 
choose to innovate. 
Again, thank you for allowing me to say a few words. 
 
